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The Temporal Anteriority/Posteriority Parameter in Inferentials
Yuto Hirayama∗
1 Introduction
This paper argues that the semantics of the English epistemic modal should and Japanese indirect
evidential yooda involves temporal requirements. I further propose that the differences between
the two with regard to these temporal components can be parameterized with a micro parame-
ter. Throughout this paper, I use the term inferentials to cover inferential expressions, including
epistemic modals and evidentials. The temporal requirements I address concerns the relationship
between the temporal denotation of the prejacent and the time in which the speaker acquires the
evidence for the utterance, which I call Evidence Acquisition Time, EAT, following the terminology
used by Lee (2013) and Smirnova (2013), among others. My argument is informally as follows: Let
p be the prejacent and EARLIEST(p) be the initial time that p is true. Then, should is only felicitous
if EAT < EARLIEST(p) (i.e., EAT temporally precedes EARLIEST(p)), while yooda is only felicitous
if the reverse relationship is obtained; that is, if EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT.
This paper focuses on the epistemic use of should. As a convention, I accordingly use the
semantic anomaly mark # on should-sentences in this paper to mean that should does not have the
epistemic reading in those cases; # does not indicate that should is infelicitous in either the epistemic
or deontic readings (# on sentences with other inferentials entails the usual interpretation). I also use
expressions such as “should is infelicitous/deviant/unacceptable...”; these mean that the epistemic
interpretation of should cannot be obtained.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses observations indicating that
should and yooda hardwire their own temporal requirements. It also argues that the causal analysis
based on Davis and Hara (2014) cannot explain all data and that the temporal requirements are
needed independently. Section 3 formulates the idea presented in Section 2. Section 4 proposes
parameterization over the semantic difference between the two inferentials, and discusses how other
inferentials (i.e. the German epistemic modals sollte and mu¨sste and Japanese reportative evidential
sooda) share the relevant parameter. Finally, Section 5 briefly describes the implications of this
paper on the current evidential literature and the universality of the semantic categories.
2 The need for temporal requirements
This section presents that should and yooda hardwire EAT < EARLIEST(p) and EARLIEST(p)≤ EAT,
respectively. Section 2.1 introduces basic observations. Section 2.2 addresses whether the causal
approach inspired by Davis and Hara (2014) is sufficient for capturing all data, and argues that the
temporal requirements are needed independently from the causal ones.
2.1 Basic observations
We begin with the following examples:
(1) (P visits M in the hospital. P sees through the window of the hospital room that the doctors
look worried. P says:)
a. #She should be very sick. (Matthewson and Truckenbrodt (2018:299))
b. Kanojo-wa
she-TOP
totemo
very
taityoo-ga
health-NOM
warui
bad
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that she is very sick.’
∗I give my sincere gratitude to Eri Tanaka and Lisa Matthewson. Needless to say, all remaining errors are
my own. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number: 18J10406.
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In (1), EAT is the time P sees the doctor look worried. The prejacent is She is very sick and
EARLIEST(p) is the moment she got very sick. Given that the doctors begin to worry about the
patient’s health after they learn that she is in bad condition, EARLIEST(p) is prior to EAT.
The two inferentials show opposite acceptability in the following example:
(2) (P poisons M’s food and leaves. Later, P says:)
a. She should be very sick now. (Matthewson and Truckenbrodt (2018:299))
b. #Kanojo-wa
she-TOP
ima
now
totemo
very
taityoo-ga
health-NOM
warui
bad
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that she is very sick now.’
Here, EAT = the time P poisons M’s food, and EARLIEST(p) = the moment she became very
sick. Of course, the act of poisoning the food precedes the instance in which the person who ingests
it becomes sick. Therefore, EAT < EARLIEST(p) in this context. The acceptability of the two
inferentials in (1) and (2) suggests that should and yooda lexically encode EAT < EARLIEST(p) and
EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAR, respectively.
2.2 Causation is not the whole story
One may question the necessity of the temporal requirement. Davis and Hara (2014) argue that
yooda imposes a causal requirement in which the event in its prejacent causes the event described
in the proposition serving as evidence (henceforth, the evidence proposition). As we will see below,
this requirement explains the contrast between (1b) and (2b).1 The should-data (1a) and (2a) are
also captured if we posit the converse direction of causation for should, that is, the requirement that
the prejacent of should must be caused by the evidence proposition. Are the temporal requirements
then necessary? This subsection argues that the causal analyses are not sufficient for explaining the
distribution of inferentials. As such, the temporal requirements must be maintained independently
from the causal one.
First, (in)felicity of the two inferentials can be accounted for by positing Davis and Hara’s
causal requirement for yooda and the opposite requirement for should. In (1), the prejacent (she
is very sick) causes the doctors to look worried. The context is thus compatible with the causal
requirement of yooda, but not with that of should. In (2), the evidence proposition (the speaker P
poisoned M’s food) conversely causes the prejacent (she is very sick). As such, should is felicitous
while yooda is not. Thus, the causal requirements may appear sufficient for capturing the distribution
of the two inferentials.
However, should and yooda are infelicitous if their relevant temporal requirements (EAT <
EARLIEST(p) for should and EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT for yooda) are violated. This is true even when
their causal requirements are are satisfied. Specifically, should is infelicitous in (3):
(3) (If John is presenting at a conference, he always practices in his hotel-room bathroom in the
morning before his talk. You had no idea John was presenting at this conference, but you
show up and see him presenting. Someone asks you where John was this morning. You
say:)
#John should have been in his hotel-room bathroom practicing for his presentation.
The prejacent is John was in his hotel-room bathroom practicing for his presentation, and the
evidence proposition is John is now presenting. Therefore, should’s causal requirement that the
evidence proposition cause the prejacent is satisfied given that John’s upcoming presentation causes
him to be in his bathroom. However, its temporal requirement is not satisfied because it is clear that
EAT (the time when the speaker sees John presenting) does not precede EARLIEST(p) (the moment
John entered his bathroom). The infelicity of (3) indicates the presence of the temporal requirement.
This is further supported by the felicity of the following example:
1Relatedly, Takubo (2009) and Krawczyk (2012) argue that the prejacents of evidentials must be the expla-
nations for the evidence.
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(4) (If John is presenting at a conference, he always practices in his hotel-room bathroom in the
morning before his talk. Yesterday, you saw on the website of the conference that he would
be presenting today. Today, in the morning, someone asks you where John is. You say:)
John should be in his hotel-room bathroom practicing for his presentation.
The context satisfies the causal requirement as in (3): John’s presentation causes him to be in
his bathroom. In (4), however, EAT is the time when the speaker saw the conference website and
EARLIEST(p) is the moment John entered his bathroom, so EAT < EARLIEST(p), satisfying should’s
temporal requirement. The contrast between (3) and (4) empirically underpins the necessity of the
temporal requirement.
The same argument is also valid for yooda. Consider (5):
(5) (John comes to university in a formal suit only if he is going to attend a party that night. You
saw John wearing a formal suit at the university at lunchtime today. Tonight, John’s friend
calls you and asks where he is. You say:)
#John-wa
John-TOP
ima
now
paatii-ni
party-at
syussekisi-tei-ru
attend-PROG-PRES
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that John is at a party.’
In (5), the prejacent and evidence propositions are John is at a party and John is wearing a
formal suit, respectively. Davis and Hara’s (2014) causal requirement is satisfied because John’s
attendance causes him to wear the suit. However, (5) is unacceptable. In this example, EAT = the
time the speaker saw John wearing a formal suit, while EARLIEST(p) = the moment John arrived at
a party, so EAT < EARLIEST(p), thereby violating yooda’s temporal requirement. Note that yooda
becomes felicitous if the speaker discusses John’s future attendance:
(6) (John comes to university in a formal suit only if he is going to attend a party that night.
Today, you see John wearing a formal suit at the university at lunchtime. Just at that moment,
John’s friend calls you and asks where John will be tonight. You say:)
John-wa
John-TOP
kyoo
today
paatii-ni
party-to
syussekisu-ru
attend-PRES
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that John will attend a party.’
As we will see below, assuming the modal analysis of the future tense (Enc¸ (1996), among
others), the prejacent of (6) (John will attend a party today) becomes true when John’s future at-
tendance is determined (e.g., when John decides to attend). Therefore, EARLIEST(p) precedes EAT,
that is, the moment the speaker sees John wearing a formal suit, because his attendance must have
been determined when he put on the suit, let alone when the speaker sees him wearing it. That is,
(6) is compatible with EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT. If yooda did not hardwire such a temporal constraint,
then the contrast between (5) and (6) would not arise.
One may argue against the current claim that the causal requirements cannot capture the oddity
of (3) and (5), by saying that they are infelicitous because the effect of the causation temporally
precedes its cause in those examples. Traditionally, one of the necessary conditions for causation
is that the effect must not precede its cause (cf. Menzies (2017)). If should and yooda encode
such a traditional causation, then it can be said that they are infelicitous when the cause-preceding
requirement is violated. In fact, (3) and (5) violate this requirement; the effects (i.e., John being in
his bathroom practicing for his presentation in (3) and John wearing a formal suit in (5)) precede the
causes (i.e., John having a presentation in (3) and John being at a party in (5)).
However, if causation involved in the semantics of should and yooda imposes the cause-preceding
requirement, then it will also rule out (4) and (6). This is because causation is a relationship between
events; the causes and effects in these examples are the same events as in their counterpart exam-
ples. Specifically, in both (3) and (4), the cause is the event in which John has a presentation, while
the effect is that John is practicing for it in his bathroom.2 In both (5) and (6), the cause is the
2The cause in (4) is not the event in which the speaker sees the website: The speaker seeing the website
cannot cause John to be in his bathroom.
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John-attending-party event, while the effect is the John-wearing-suit event. Therefore, if (3) and (5)
are infelicitous due to violation of the cause-preceding requirement, (4) and (6) should be ruled out
for the same reason. The felicity of the latter examples indicates that should and yooda allow the
backward causation in which the cause comes later than the effect, and (3) and (5) sound odd due to
violation of the temporal requirements EAT < EARLIEST(p) and EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT.
Furthermore, if the causation involved in the two inferentials accompanies the cause-preceding
requirement, then it should form the temporal relation between the prejacent event and the event of
the evidence proposition (which I call the evidence event) rather than the relation between the preja-
cent and EAT. Specifically, should and yooda ought to require EARLIEST(τ(eev))≤ EARLIEST(p) and
EARLIEST(p) ≤ EARLIEST(τ(eev)), respectively, where τ(eev) is the runtime of the evidence event.
Then, should is predicted to be felicitous, while yooda is to be infelicitous, if τ(eev) ≤ EARLIEST(p)
≤ EAT. However, these predictions are not borne out.
(7) a. (You see John’s facebook profile and learn that yesterday was John’s birthday. You
didn’t know this. John is a very sociable person and has many friends that would come
to his birthday party if he calls on them to come. You say:)
#John should have had a birthday party.
b. (John comes to university with a tennis racket bag only when he plays tennis after
lunchtime. Today, in the evening, you see John carrying a racket bag. You say:)
John-wa
John-TOP
kyoo
today
tenisu-o
tennis-ACC
si-ta
do-PAST
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that John played tennis today.’
In (7a), the evidence event (it being John’s birthday) causes him to have a birthday party, but
the initial moment of its runtime does not follow EARLIEST(p) (i.e., when John began his birthday
party). Therefore, the evidence causes the prejacent and the cause-preceding requirement is ful-
filled. However, the temporal requirement EAT < EARLIEST(p) is violated because EAT is the time
when thespeaker checks the calendar. The badness of (7a) underpins the necessity of my proposed
temporal requirement. In (7b), on the other hand, the earliest moment of the evidence event is when
John came to university with his racket bag. Such a moment precedes the causing event, i.e., John
playing tennis, meaning that the cause-preceding requirement is violated as in (5). However, (7b) is
felicitous (unlike (5)) because EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT is satisfied (EAT is when the speaker sees John
carrying his racket bag in the evening). If the cause-preceding requirement were involved in the two
inferentials, then the two examples in (7) would show the opposite acceptabilities.
Although the temporal requirements explain all data presented so far, note that this does not
mean that we can do without the causal requirements. Indeed, the causal requirement of yooda as
proposed by Davis and Hara (2014) accounts for the contrast found in the following examples.
(8) a. (Seeing a wet street, you say:)
Ame-ga
rain-NOM
fut-ta
fall-PAST
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that it rained.’
b. (Seeing falling raindrops from the window, you say:)
#Michi-ga
street-NOM
nureteiru
wet
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that streets are wet.’
In (8a), the prejacent (it rained) causes the evidence proposition (a street is wet), while such
a causation in (8b) does not hold (wet streets do not cause raindrops to fall). As such, Davis and
Hara’s causal requirement that yooda’s prejacent must be the cause of the evidence proposition
captures this contrast. Our temporal requirement does not exclude (8b); EAT, which is at the same
time or just before UT, clearly comes later than EARLIEST(p) (i.e., the moment streets got wet). We
must therefore posit the causal requirement independently of the temporal one in order to capture
the correct distribution of yooda.
Likewise, we should maintain the causal requirement on should in which its prejacent must be
caused by the evidence proposition. Consider the following:
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(9) (Looking at someone who looks green in the face)
#He should vomit soon. (Matthewson (2015))
EAT is at the same time or just before UT, while EARLIEST(p) is the moment he vomits. There-
fore, the temporal requirement EAT < EARLIEST(p) is satisfied; nevertheless, (9) is odd. The causal
requirement accounts for the deviance: the evidence proposition someone looks green in the face
does not cause the prejacent he vomits soon. If the evidence event successfully causes the prejacent
event, should is felicitous with the same temporal relation, as follows:
(10) (The speaker has just inhaled some sneezing powder)
I should sneeze. (Matthewson (2015): cited from Yalcin (2016:241-242))
EAT (when the speaker inhaled powder) precedes the moment the speaker sneezes, and the
evidence event (the event in which the speaker inhaled powder) causes the sneezing event. The
contrast between (9) and (10) indicates that the causal requirement is also necessary in empirical
terms.
3 Formal implementation
This section discusses formalization of the temporal requirements for should and yooda. I assume
the referential tense, following Partee (1973) and Kratzer (1998), among others:3
(11) a. A proposition without tense: J p Kg = λti.λws. p(t)(w) = 1.
b. J present Kg is defined only if there is a contextually salient time t1 such that UT ⊆ t1.
If defined, J present Kg = t1.
c. J past Kg is defined only if there is a contextually salient time t1 such that t1 < UT.
If defined, J past Kg = t1.
The referential tense theory says that tenses are pronouns that carry a presupposition which
specifies the temporal relation between them and the time of utterance.
I formulate the EARLIEST operator as in (12), following Beaver and Condoravdi (2003):
(12) a. EARLIESTw = λp〈i, st〉. the unique m such thatJ p Kg({m})(w′) ∧ ∀t′[J p Kg(t′)(w′)→ m ≤ t′] for a world w′ maximally similar to w.
b. m ≤ t iff ∀m′[m′ ∈ t→ m ≤ m′].
The EARLIEST operator takes a proposition p of type 〈i, st〉 and picks up the moment that
precedes all other intervals making p true. Note that m is required to make p true in some world
that is maximally similar to w rather than in w. If m makes p true in w (instantiates p in Beaver
and Condoravdi’s (2003) terminology), then the EARLIEST operator will be veridical. Given that
p corresponds to the prejacent of should and yooda, the veridicaliry of the operator results in the
veridicality of the two inferentials, which is undesirable.4
As the reader may have already noticed, a tensed proposition (as is) is incompatible with the
EARLIEST operator in terms of type. In this framework, tensed propositions are of type 〈s, t〉 while
the argument of the EARLIEST operator must be of type 〈i, st〉. We must therefore posit an abstraction
rule that converts 〈s, t〉 elements to 〈i, st〉 elements. Following Sharvit (2014), I assume the rule (13)
and (14) is how it works:
3Sharvit (2014) argues that the Japanese past tense is existential, while the English past tense is referential.
In (11), I do not intend to argue against this claim. Rather, my idea can be implemented even with the existential
past tense (see Hirayama (to appear) for details). I adopt the referential view simply because I cannot show
how my idea is implemented with existential tenses in addition to the implementation with referential tenses
for the sake of space.
4Although inferentials are basically considered non-veridical, several previous studies have argued that
their target inferentials are veridical (von Fintel and Gillies (2010) for the English epistemic modal must, and
Sauerland and Schenner (2007), Koev (2011) for Bulgarian indirect evidential -l-).
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(13) J p Kg can be shifted to [λx. J p Kg[n→ x]], which is defined only if the presupposition ofJ p Kg[n→ x] is satisfied, where x is an arbitrary variable.
(14) a. J She is very sick Kg = λw. she is very sick at t1 in w (defined only if UT ⊆ t1).
b. ((13) applied)
λt. J She is very sick Kg[1→ t], defined only if the presupposition of J She is very sick Kg[1→ t]
is satisfied.
c. = λt.λw. she is very sick at t in w, defined only if UT ⊆ t.
As shown above, the abstraction rule (13) converts the type of a tensed proposition to 〈i,st〉, with
which a type mismatch does not occur when the EARLIEST operator is applied to that proposition.
With these assumptions, I propose the following definedness conditions for should and yooda.5
(15) Let q be the contextually salient proposition serving as evidence:
a. J should Kg(p)(w)(t) is defined only if
∃t′[the speaker learns q at t′ ∧ t′ ≤ t ∧ t′ < EARLIESTw(p)].
b. J yooda Kg(p)(w)(t) is defined only if
∃t′[the speaker learns q at t′ ∧ t′ ≤ t ∧ EARLIESTw(p) ≤ t′].
In the above formulation, t′ is the time when the speaker learns the evidence proposition, that is,
EAT. Given that evidence acquisition comes at least as early as the utterance based on the evidence,
we need the second conjunct t′ ≤ t (as argued by Smirnova (2013)). Should requires that t′ precede
EARLIEST(p), while yooda requires the reverse ordering: EARLIEST(p) ≤ t′.
As I mentioned above, yooda’s temporal requirement EARLIEST(p) ≤ t′ may seem inconsistent
with cases in which the prejacent describes a future event such as (6). This is because its runtime
is inevitably located later than EAT. Koev (2011) argues that the Bulgarian indirect evidential -l-
is only felicitous if the runtime of the prejacent event precedes EAT, and faces the same problem.
To circumvent this, he assumes that -l- will require EAT to temporally follow some salient stages
of the preparatory process of the prejacent event instead of its runtime, when the prejacent’s tense
is non-past. However, as Smirnova (2013) points out, the ontological status of such a preparatory
process is unclear, and there is no independent motivation for such an assumption.
However, my analysis accommodates cases in which the prejacent involves a future event, with
the modal analysis of future tenses (Enc¸ (1996) and Bochnak (2019), among others):
(16) J Future p Kg = λt.λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂MB(t)(w)→ ∃t′[t < t′ ∧ p(t′)(w′)]].
This is a Kratzer-style modal analysis for future tenses. MB(t)(w) represents the circumstantial
modal base consisting of the relevant facts at t in w (Abusch (2012)).6 Future-p becomes true when
the facts entail that p will be true in the future. With this, the prejacent of (6) denotes the following:
(17) J John will be at a party Kg = λt.λw. ∀w′[w′ ∈ ⋂MB(t)(w)→ ∃t′[t < t′ ∧ John is at a party at
t′ in w′]].
This becomes true when the facts entail that John will be at a party in the future. In other words,
it becomes true when John’s future attendance is determined (e.g., when John decides to attend the
party). Therefore, the temporal denotation of (17) (i.e., the set of intervals t such that (17) is true at
t) is the set of intervals at which John’s future attendance is determined. Thus, EARLIEST(p) is the
exact moment when John’s future attendance is determined. Such a moment clearly precedes EAT in
(6) (the moment the speaker sees him wearing a formal suit), because John’s future attendance must
have been determined when the speaker witnesses him wearing a suit. The relevant temporalities
are depicted in Figure 1.
Note that one of the differences between my account and Koev’s (2011) is that my account
does not rely on the runtime of events. Rather it relies on the temporal denotation of the prejacent.
EARLIEST(p) are not required to correspond to the initial moment of the runtime of the prejacent
5I do not commit to what assertive content the two inferentials have.
6(16) is somewhat simplified because it makes no reference to the ordering source. I redact these complica-
tions because a reference to the modal base is enough for my account to work.
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Figure 1: The relevant temporalities in (6)
event; in the case of future-tensed sentences, the event time is located in the future. It can never
come as early as EAT, while the leftmost point of the temporal denotation can. Thus we are not
forced to posit additional assumptions onto the ontology.
4 Parameterization and other inferentials
We have so far seen that the two inferentials should and yooda hardwire their own temporal require-
ments: EAT < EARLIEST(p) for should and EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT for yooda. This difference can be
parameterized in terms of whether EAT is anterior/posterior to EARLIEST(p), as in Table 1, where
[EAT-anterior] means that EAT comes before EARLIEST(p) and [EAT-posterior] means the opposite
relationship.
should yooda
[EAT-anterior] [EAT-posterior]
Table 1: Parametric variation in the semantics of the two inferentials
If the difference between the two inferentials is the result of a semantic parameter [EAT-anterior/posterior],
then it is highly conceivable that other inferential expressions share the same parameter settings,
and those inferentials are subject to the same definedness conditions as (15) (in other words, the
conditions in (15) are not idiosyncratic to should and yooda). This conjecture is correct: the Ger-
man epistemic modals sollte and mu¨sste are [EAT-anterior] while the Japanese reportative evidential
sooda is [EAT-posterior].7 First, the German sollte and mu¨sste show the same distribution as should
as far as the contexts in (1) and (2) are concerned:
(18) a. (P visits M in the hospital. P sees through the window of the hospital room that the
doctors look worried. P says:)
#Sie
she
sollte/mu¨sste
sollte/mu¨sste
sher
very
krank
sick
sein.
be
‘She should be very sick.’ (Matthewson and Truckenbrodt (2018:298-299))
7It may seem strange that I treat sooda as an inferential, since there is no agreement about whether the
speaker makes inference when using reportatives, although previous studies such as Matthewson et al. (2007)
argue that some reportative evidentials are epistemic modals, a typical instance of inferentials. Given the
following data, I claim that the use of sooda involves some inference:
(i) (A told you that it is not raining. Then B asks you whether she needs to take an umbrella when she
leave. You answer:)
Kasa-wa
umbrella-TOP
hituyoo-nai
necessary-NEG
sooda.
sooda
‘I hear that you don’t need an umbrella.’
In (i), the reportative evidence (i.e., A’s report about raining) says nothing about whether B needs to take an
umbrella. However, the speaker uses A’s report to infer that B needs to do so.
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b. (P poisons M’s food and leaves. Later P says:)
Sie
she
sollte/mu¨sste
sollte/mu¨sste
sher
very
krank
sick
sein.
be
‘She should be very sick.’ (Matthewson and Truckenbrodt (2018:298-299))
As I mentioned in Section 2.1., EARLIEST(p) < EAT in (18a), and EAT < EARLIEST(p) in (18b).
Sollte and mu¨sste are only felicitous in (2), just as should. This means that they and should share the
temporal requirement EAT < EARLIEST(p) and that they are also [EAT-anterior] as well.
By contrast, the Japanese reportative evidential sooda is [EAT-posterior]. It sounds odd when
EAT (when the speaker obtains reportative evidence about the prejacent) precedes EARLIEST(p),
while it does not when EAT does not precede EARLIEST(p):
(19) a. (At lunchtime, John told you that he was going to attend a party tonight. Tonight, some-
one asks you what John is doing. You say:)
#John-wa
John-TOP
paatii-ni
party-to
syussekisi-tei-ru
attend-PROG-PRES
sooda.
sooda.
‘I hear that John is at a party.’
b. (John tells you that he is going to attend a party tonight. Just after that, someone asks
you what John is going to do tonight. You say:)
John-wa
John-TOP
paatii-ni
party-to
syusseki-suru
attend-PRES
sooda.
sooda
‘I hear that John is going to attend a party.’
In (19a), where sooda is infelicitous, EAT is when the speaker was told about John’s attendance,
while EARLIEST(p) is the moment John arrives at a party. This is because the prejacent in (19a) is
the present progressive form. Therefore, EAT < EARLIEST(p). In (19b), on the other hand, while
EAT is the same time as that in (19b), the prejacent of (19b) is a future proposition with a temporal
denotation that contains intervals at which John’s future attendance is determined (as I explained in
Section 3). Given that one does not tell others that she is going to a party before she decides to do so,
EARLIEST(p) precedes EAT in (19b). In these examples, the (in)felicity of sooda in these examples
shows that it is [EAT-posterior] just as yooda.
We have seen that the German sollte and mu¨sste, as well as the Japanese sooda encode the
temporal requirements on the relation between EAT and EARLIEST(p), in addition to should and
yooda. This supports the claim that the temporal semantic parameter [EAT-anterior/posterior] is
not specific to should and yooda, thus indicating the possibility that such a parameter is ubiquitous
among inferential meanings.
5 Implications
The first implication concerns the fact that yooda has a different status compared to evidentials that
are considered to have temporal contributions in the literature. Just as I observed for yooda, several
previous studies (Fleck (2007), Chung (2007), Lee (2013), Smirnova (2013), to name a few) observe
that evidentials encode a temporal restriction on the relationship between EAT and the prejacent
in their target languages. My findings are novel because those temporal evidentials addressed in
the literature are all involved in (or fused with) tense-inflections. For example, Smirnova (2013)
argues that the Bulgarian indirect evidential -l-, which is involved in the verbal inflection, requires
its prejacent to be evaluated relative to EAT rather than to UT. Likewise, the Korean evidential -te,
which interacts with the prejacent’s temporal denotation, is one instance of the Korean tense system
according to Chung (2007) (Table 3).
However, yooda differs from this type of evidentials in that it is not involved in tense-inflection,
as follows:
(20) John-ga
John-NOM
ki-ta
come-PAST
ga
but
Mary-wa
Mary-TOP
ko-naka-tta
come-NEG-PAST
yooda.
yooda
‘It seems that John came but Mary did not come’
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Indicative form Evidential form
Present
pisˇe- /0
write.IPFV-3SG.PRES
pisˇe-l-a
write.IMPFPRES-EVID-FEM
Past
pisa- /0
write.IPFV-3SG.PAST
pisa-l-a
write.IMPFPAST-EVID-FEM
Table 2: The inflectional table for pisˇa ‘write’ (Adapted from Smirnova (2013:483))
Simple tense Evidential tense
Present -nun or /0 -ney
Past -essess -te
Table 3: The Korean tense system (Adapted from Chung (2007:189))
In (20), yooda scopes over the two tensed conjuncts John came and Mary did not come. If yooda
were part of the tense-inflection, then it should also be attached to the tense of the first conjunct.
This means that the presence of the temporal contributions is not restricted to evidentials that come
with tense, thus raising the possibility that temporal aspects of meaning are more prevalent than
currently assumed in the evidential literature (Matthewson and Hirayama (2019) report that English
indirect evidentials apparently and seem and the St’a´t’imcets indirect evidential -an’ encode the
same temporal restriction as yooda).
The second implication is that the observations on should, yooda, and other inferentials in this
paper support von Fintel and Matthewson (2008), who hypothesizes that semantic categories are
composed of smaller building blocks. According to von Fintel and Matthewson, the class of accom-
plishment verb cannot be maintained universally, because “at least some Salish languages possess a
class of verbs which correspond in their lexical content to English accomplishments, but which do
not entail culmination of the event in the perfective aspect” (von Fintel and Matthewson (2008:154)).
They instead hypothesize the existence of smaller universal building blocks and that the event struc-
ture of a verb is composed of these. This involves choosing which building block to encode and
how. For example, according to Travis (2005), Malagasy accomplishments (unlike English ones)
do not entail the culmination of the described event. Rather, it is the result of implicature. This
implies that whether or not the described event is culminated is one of the universal building blocks
for accomplishments, and Malagasy accomplishments (not English ones) encode it as implicature.
This idea can be extended to the inferential domain. This paper had argued that some inferentials
encode temporal contributions that are independent from their inferential component (i.e., the one
specifying the type of reasoning or inference involved), and the evidence-specifications (e.g., direct,
indirect, and reportative) in the case of evidentials. This is compatible with the view that the tem-
poral relationship represented between EAT and the prejacent’s temporal denotation is a potential
building block. This view is especially motivated by the fact that yooda and sooda both encode
EARLIEST(p) ≤ EAT, although they have different evidence-type specifications (yooda is indirect,
while sooda is reportative). In other words, the presence of the temporal contribution cross-cuts
other aspects of evidential meanings. In addition, note that Matthewson and Hirayama (2019) ob-
serve that St’a´t’imcets and Gitksan reportative evidentials do not pose temporal requirements. Some
reportatives (e.g., sooda) make temporal contributions while others (e.g., St’a´t’imcets and Gitksan
ones) do not have such components. This corroborates the current conjecture that whether and how
the temporal requirement is encoded is a universal building block that exists independently of other
inferential meaning aspects such as evidence-type specification.
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